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ABSTRACT
Implementation Through Governmental Bureaucracy
A Study of the Factors that Cause Projects Implementation Delay
In Egypt
by
Faten Ahmed Moustafa Gamiee
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in December 1984, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
The Degree of Master of City Planning
For Developing Areas
For a long time now, construction planning and project
implementation processes in Egypt have reached a stage that calls
for problem-solving methods. Projects implementation, always,
substantially falls behind their original scheduled timetables.
Moreover, in some other cases projects might be confronted with
sudden cancellation regardless of the stage they have reached in
their implementation process.
This deteriorated situation perturbs the Egyptian nati onal
budget cycle and causes enormous economic loss especially with
regard to the very limited national capital resources. This is in
addition to some other interrelated important consequences. This
situation necessitates paying a great deal of attention to
thoroughly investigating and analyzing the factors that vitally
a+f-ect and result in projects development and implementation
processes delay.
This thesis will be an attempt to underlie these vital
factors on its different pertinent levels (the government, the
agencies involved in the implementation process and the
implementors levels).
It is the contention of this study that the projects
development and implementation processes factors of delay result
from: 1 - The output of the organizational process and
procedures through the inevitable institutional bureaucracy
which governs the general structure of the Egyptian government.
This situation necessitates paying bureaucracy serious
attention to study its heavy impact on the government's policies
and strategies. 2 - Various interrelated factors such as the
politics of the Middle East; the national political process; the
budget cycle; the links to foreign economic process and the
relationships among the various agencies and organizations
involved in the projects development and implementation
processes. This is in addition to two major factors (out of the
scope of this thesis) that operate on the overall planning level:
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1 - The unclear definition of the policy goals according to the
amount of resources available in the country and the strategy to
allocate these resources through a well organized administration
structure, a fact that may call for restructuring the
government's administrative system to serve the broad goals of
the country. 2 - The general absence of an agreed methodological
planning framework and the shifting and the multiple
institutional roles throughout the planning process period.
The results and recommendations provided in this study
suggest: 1 - The use of the PERT/CPM techni ques to control the
overall management of construction projects. 2 -It suggests paths
for change and correction on the three different levels
(government, public agencies involved, and the implementors
levels). At the government level: develop an efficient strategy
for fund allocation, study projects initially to assure their
legitimization and annual allocations, identify the roles of the
different agencies and organizations involved in project
development and implementation processes, facilitate import of
construction materials, pursue a policy that limits the technical
and labor manpower emigration, encourage the factories to work at
full capacity or arrange the budget to include building others
and encourage technical education. At the agency level: develop
promotion features to be on a competitve basis within the same
personnel specialized sector with priority to higher educational
degrees, push decisions down to lower levels, allow additional
work on a -free-lance basis, encourage innovation, solve the
professionals problems to keep them in the country, develop
coordination within the agency and among the various agencies
when dealing with the agency, facilitate rules to be flexible,
establish a system to examine project possibilities for execution
initially, adjust the estimated time-tables to include reasonable
delays, and develop the follow-up system. At the implementor
level: If the previous suggestions would be well carried out, the
implementor's problems would be much helped. 3 - At the same time
the study reveals problems which are basically uncorrectable,
such as the uncertainty issue, yet suggests the best possible
ways to deal with them.
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I - INTRODUCTION
This thesis analyzes the factors that exercise
different types of influence on projects' development and
implementation processes in Egypt. Politics, budget cycle,
relationships among the various agencies and organizations
involved in implementing any project, etc. are examples of
these vital factors. A major one is the inevitable
bureaucracy.
Bureaucracy, as a hierarchical system, is established
to carry out projects through decision-making bureaucrats.
Yet, its hierarchical nature becomes a hindrance to any
project to be implemented, resulting in a lot of pitfalls.
This happens because the Egyptian government does not
adequately set implementation policies in relation to the
characteristics of the institutional bureaucracy.
Therefore, this study will analyze the effects of
bureaucracy on projects' development and implementation
processes using the "Egyptian International Hotel" project
as a case study.
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A - RATIONALE OF THE THESIS
As I previously emphasized, bureaucracy is an
institutional system that governs the general structure of
the Egyptian government and_ significantly affects the
government's policies and strategies.
This situation makes it very important to speak for a
while about bureaucracy, as a device and a system, through
providing a brief general overview about its nature to see
the rationale behind its existance and to recognize its
different applicable models (frames of reference).
This is to proceed to see, when bureaucracy has first
established in Egypt? How it has always been applied?
and how its hierarchical nature has performed with
characteristics that becomes a hindrance to any project
to be implemented resulting in a lot of pitfalls.
The case study of the "Egyptian International Hotel"
project will help great deal to recognize and identify the
pitfalls of the Egyptian institutional bureaucracy in
addition to the other important interrelated factors of its
different types of influence. This will help suggest paths
and policies for change and correction to deal with
bureaucracy according to its institutional characteristics
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as well as with the other types and kinds of projects'
development and implementation processes factors of delay.
Its my hope that such a study may be considered by the
Egyptian government, organizations and agencies so as to
avoid similar pitfalls in the -future when developing and
implementing any project.
B - METHODOLOGY
The aim of this study is to analyze and to demonstrate
the factors that exercise different types of influence on
projects' development and implementation processes in
Egypt. The best approach for such an analysis is to trace
the movement of projects from idea to completion within any
governmental sector (here the study concentrates on the
construction sector as its being the field of experience of
the author).
This approach is especially because it has always been
observed and proved that projects in Egypt constitute the
unifying elements that link together the large number of
agencies that involved in the construction planning and
projects development and implementation processes.
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The analysis will present the scope of the problem
manifesting the output of the organizational process
through the institutional bureaucracy as well as the output
of the other political interrelated factors.
The study will not be a review of the case study from
the design technical aspects but rather from the
institutional and political context.
The methodology of this approach, the attitude and the
points of reference for this sort of study are based on:
(1) The personal observation reflected in the background of
the author. This includes eleven years of experience from
1/1973 - 9/198"3 working for the Ministry of Housing in
Egypt as a designer and a site supervisor for both the
public and the private sectors.
(2) Reviewing the relevant litrature on the subject.
(3) The outcome of the author's participation in the
Special Program for Urban and Regional Studies (SPURS) at
the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at M.I.T.
from 9/1983. - 7/1984.
C - PLAN OF THE THESIS
The thesis will be divided into five major sections
(refer to diagram 1). The first section will include a
12
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general overview of bureaucracy. This will be a theoretical
discussion about the nature of bureaucracy: its definition,
origins, sources of growth, governing principles., strengths
and advantages and routine decisions. This will help
recognize the rationale behind its existance and the way it
should perform. Then the section will proceed by
providing a presentation of three applicable frames of
reference or models for bureaucracy, suggesting the
"Organizational Behavior Model" as the most appropriate one
to the case study. That model will help, efficiently, to
speculate about the consequences of the organizational
operations, procedures, etc. which affects projects
implementation process.
The second section will present a historical overview
about bureaucracy in Egypt to realize how bureaucracy has
always been governing the structure of the Egyptian
government throughout the history until now.
The third section will present the case study, in
detail, providing analysis of the output of organizational
processes through the institutional bureaucracy and the
other interrelated factors. These analysis will be
highlighted all along the way.
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The fourth section will provide a summary that
underlies the major issues analyzed and highlighted through
the case study, as to be the factors that influence project'
development and implementation processes on the various
levels (agency, government and implementor levels).
Finally, the fifth section will suggest some paths and
implications for change and correction, on these various
levels demonstrating, at the same time, the problems that
are basically uncorrectable.
15
II - A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF BUREAUCRACY
16
A - DEFINITION OF BUREAUCRACY:
The natural history of bureaucracy suggests that
bureaucracy is far more than a complex social organization
pursuing its goals. It has a special form within a social
function that shapes its characteristics. Seitz tried to
define bureaucracy as follows:
"Bureaucracy is a special form of social
organizations that provides procedures
to elaborate and administer substantive
guidelines for structuring political
action through the delegation and
1
specialization of authority."
In other words, Seitz sees bureaucracy as a procedural
device. Another opinion about bureaucracy that amazed me is
Max Weber's opinion which is ambiguous. Sometimes he
describes bureaucracy by saying that it is an animated
machine, activated only by specific orders. At other times
he sees it as possessing a considerable power of its own, a
power deriving from its expertise and specialized
knowledge.
However, Fredrick C. Dyer suggested the following
definition, which is an adaptation from "The American
17
Encyclopedia", for both bureaucracy and bureaucrats:
"Bureaucracy is a form of organization
through which government is carried on
by means of bureau, each of which manages
a particular branch of business.... each
bureau is heirarchially organized with a
chief at its head on whom rests the final
responsibility, whereas as in the collegial
or board system a number of persons of
coequal authority divide responsibility."
"The bureaucrats are usually trained and
experienced administrators. They are little
affected by outsiders they exhibit tendency
toward a caste spirit; they overemphasize
2
routine ( "red tape" ) and formalities."
In fact, that definition recognizes that bureaucracy
has admirable elements. Recognizing such elements is the
first step toward enhancing the good features and
controlling the bad features of bureaucrats (if such can
ever be done).
However, bureaucrats have always been hated because
they try to push people around. This due to the nature of
18
bureaucracy which tends to provide authoritarian persons
with opportunities to be bullies. The structure of
bureaucracy and the types of people it retains or promotes
tend toward a rigidity that is offensive to outsiders.
B - ORIGIN OF BUREAUCRACY (Birth):
A GENERAL OVERVIEW
Bureaucracy comes into being when more people are
subject to the direction of the leader than can fall within
his personal span of control. As an orqanization grows in
size, it becomes imperative that some of the tasks of
direction be delegated. This is the first condition for the
rise of a bureaucracy, the body of functionaries who play
the administrative role.
Bureaucratic organizations emerge from social
conditions and political organizations. Bureaucracy
appeared in many societies throughout recorded history. It
is a social device which can be used when certain problems
require solutions that other social devices can not
effectively provide. Its function is to help coordinate
people's behavior for controlling social conflict, to
struggle against nature., and to govern the relations among
societi es.
AlthoLgh all societies face basic social problems, the
scope, intensity and frequency of these problems vary
considerably from one society to another. One reason for
these differences is the relative complexity of a society.
One of the theoretical conditions behind the rise of
bureaucratic-authoritarianism in developing countries is
the increasing popularity of the idea that strict
discipline and a technocratic government are essential for
third world countries development.
C - SOURCES OR CONDITIONS FOR THE GROWTH OF BUREAUCRACY:
The following points present Fredrick C. Dyer's
opinion concerning the sources and conditions for the
3
growth of bureaucracy:
- The division of labour and the development of machinary
lead to impersonalized lines of authority and
communi cati on.
- The growth of large armies and large governmental
apparatuses leads to hierarchies which tend to
specialize to institutionalize to formalize to become
bureaucraci es.
- The society in which reverance of traditions and
customs is paramount will probably help the growth
20
of bureaucrats, who will then seek security through
controlling their environment by regulations and
procedures.
Bureaucracy can not flourish unless certain
requirements are met such as:
a-Money and Taxes: bureaucratization presupposes
the existance of a steady income for the
maintenance of the administrative apperatus. This
Of course requires a stable system of taxation.
b-Law and Orders: people will not obey rules and
procedures of bureaucracy unless they respect law
and orders. The society must be a law-abiding
one, otherwise it will neither support nor
produce bureaucrats.
D - PRINCIPLES THAT GOVERN A BUREAUCRATIC OR6NIZATION:
Max Weber explained certain principles that govern a
4
bureaucratic organization as follows:
1- The business is continuous.
2- It is conducted in accordance with rules, and
each official is assigned a specific area; he has
authority only in that area; and he must exercise
his authority under clearly defined conditions.
21
3- Responsibilities and authority are part of a
hierarchy; the higher personage supervise the
lower, but the lower have the right of appeal.
4- Officials and other employees do not own the
resources with which they deal, but can be held
accountable for them. Official jobs and revenue
are separated from private affairs and private
income.
5- Offices (positions, jobs) can not be sold or
inherited; they do not become private property.
6- Official business is conducted on the basis of
written documents.
The bureaucrat therefore:
- Is personally free and has his position by
contract.
- He exercises authority in accordance with
impersonal rules.
- He is appointed and assigned on the basis of his
technical qualifications.
- He works full time in his job.
- He is rewarded by regular salary advancement in a
lifetime career pattern.
22
E - STRENGTHS AND ADVA~NTAGES OF BUREAUCRA~CY:
Weber describes the strengths and advantages of
bureaucracy thusly:
"The decisive reason for the advance of a
bureaucratic organization has always been its
purely technical superiority over any other form
of organizations. The fully developed
bureaucratic mechanism compares with other
organizations exactly as does the machine with
the nonmechanical modes of production:precision,
speed, ambiguity, knowledge of the files,
continuity, discretion, unity, strict
subordination, reduction of friction and of
material and personnel costs - these becomes
5
optimum in strictly bureaucratic organization. "
F - ROUTINE DECISIONS:
There are four interactions in complex power
that are particularly important:
- The interactions among bureaucracies
excutive branch of government;
- The interactions among the bureaucracies
legislative branch of government;
channels
and the
and the
- The interactions among bureaucracies and the
judiciary;
- The interactions among the bureaucracies and the
public.
In fact it is important to examine these interactions
to help determine how power is shaped and shared among
bureaucracies, policy makers, and the public, and how these
interactions affect public policy.
G - FRAMES OF REFERENCE:
Bureaucracy applys in the form of different models
(frames of reference). These models are used by most people
when thinking about the foreign affairs and the
organizational process. Each frame of reference is, in
effect, a "conceptual lens" which, may lead one to see,
emphasi ze and worry about quite different aspects of
events.
In the following part, I will demonstrate a brief
analysis about the nature of each of these frames of
6
referance. My aim is to show, when we proceed to the case
study of the "Egyptian International Hotel" project, how
the analysis surrounding the case study has been applied
24
according to these different models, especially the
"Organizational Process Model", and what was the outcome of
the interactions among bureaucracies and any of the
different power channels.
Howeverwe may assume that governmental behavior can be
most satisfactory understood by analogy with the purposive
acts of individuals. In many cases this is a fruitful
assumption. Treating the governments as if they are
centrally coordinated, purposive individuals provides a
useful shorthand for understanding problems of policy. But
this simplification obscures as well as reveals. In
particular, it obscures the persistantly neglected fact of
bureaucracy: the "maker" of government policy is not one
calculating decision maker but is rather conglomerate of
large organizations and political actors.
1 - MODEL I: THE RATIONAL ACTOR OR "CLASSICAL MODEL":
Most analysts explain (and predict) the behavior of
government primarilly concerning foreign affairs, in
terms of one basic conceptual model, here entiteled
"Rational Actor" or "Classical Model". Although the
Rational Actor Model has proved useful for many purposes,
there is powerful evidence that it must be supplemented, if
-5
not supplented, by frames of reference that focus on the
governmental machine - the organizations and political
actors involved in the policy process.
Model I's implication is that important events have
important causes - large acts result from innumerable and
often conflicting smaller actions by individuals at various
levels of bureaucratic organizations in the service of a
variety of only partially compatible conceptions of
national goals, organizational goals, and political
objectives. The sense of national purposes and the pressure
created by problems in international relations, under Model
I , conflicts with the intra-national mechanisms from which
governmental actions emerge.
Model I gives an explaination for and show how the
nation or government could have chosen to act as it did,
given the strategic problems it faced. It frames the
puzzle: why do nations decide to do what to whom? It then
fixes the unit of analysis: Governmental Choice. Next it
focuses attention on certain concepts: goals and objectives
of the nation or government. And finally it invokes certain
patterns of inference: if the nation performed an action of
any sort, it must have had a goal of this type. The
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analysts has explained this event by showing how carrying
out this certain events is a reasonable action, given
specified objectives. The attempt to explain international
events by recounting the aims and calculation of nations or
governments is the trademark of the Rational Actor Model.
Thomas Schelling's opinion concerning the foundation of
this strategic theory (of Model I), is the assumption of
rational behavior - not just of intelligent behavior, but
of behavior motivated by a conscious calculation of
advantages, a calculation that in turn is based on an
explicit and internally consistant value system.
Analysts assume that what must be explained is an
action, ie., behavior that reflects purpose or intention.
They assume that the "actor" is a national government and
that the "action" is chosen as a calculated solution to a
strategic problem. The explaination for each (actor and
action) consist of showing what goals the government was
pursuing when it acted and how the action was a reasonable
choice, given the nation's objectives. This cluster of
assumptions characterizes the "Rational Actor Model".
To explain an occurrence in foreign policy means to
show how the government could have rationally chosen that
27
action. In this sense the frame of referance can be called
the "Classical Model". One advantage of the Rational Actor
Model is that it provides an inexpensive approximation by
letting the analyst think about what he would do if he were
the other part. One can make a logical assessment
of desired goals and available means as being implemented
in a manner calculated, to make the gains out-weigh the
costs. The less information about- the international affairs
of a nation or government, the greater the tendency to rely
on the classical model.
What rationality adds
"consistancy": consistancy
relatives to a particular
application of principles i
alternative. So the basic
rational action are:
alternatives; consequences;
to the concept of purpose is
among goals and objectives
action; consistancy in the
n order to select the optimal
concepts of these models of
goals and objectives ;
and choice.
2 -MODEL II: THE ORGANIZATIONAL FPROCESS MODEL:
Recent developments in organization theory provide the
foundation for the second model which emphasizes the
processes and procedures of the large organizations that
constitute a government. According to this organizational
28
process, what Model I analysts characterized as "acts" and
"choices" are thought of instead as "output" of large
organizations functioning according to regular standard
patterns of behavior.
Model II analysts frame the puzzle: From what
organizational context and pressure did any decision
emerge? He then fixes the unit of analysis: "organizational
output". Next he focuses attantion on certain concepts: the
strength, standard operating procedures (SOP), and
repertoires of organizations. Finally, he invokes certain
patterns of inference: if organizations produced an output
of this kind today, that behavior would result from
existing organizational features, procedures, and
repertoires.
To be responsive to a wide spectrum of problems,
governments consist of large organizations, among which
primary responsibility for particular tasks is divided.
Each organization attends to a special set of problems and
acts in quasi-independence on these problems. But few
important issues fall exclusively within the domain of a
single organization. Thus, government behavior relevant to
any important problem reflects the independant output of
29
several organizations, partially coordinated by government
leaders (who can substantially disturb but not
substantially control the behavior of these organizations).
To perform complex routines, the behavior of large
numbers of individuals must be coordinated. Coordination
requires standard operating procedures "rules" according to
which things are done. Reliable performance of action that
depends upon the behavior of hundreds of persons requires
established "programs".
At any given time, a government consists of existing
organizations, each with a fixed set of standard operating
procedures and programs. The behavior of these
organizations, and consequently of the government, relevant
to an issue in any particular instance is, therefore,
determined primarily by routines established in these
organizations prior to that instance. Explanation of a
government action starts from this base line, noting
incremental deviations.
The probability of an action is reduced not by the
balance but rather by the stability of the balance.
"Balance" and "stability" are believed to be the critical
determinants of the occurrence. If the undesired event
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occurs, it will be as a consequence of organizational
activity. Output of routine organizational procedures
sets the chessboard at which government leaders look when
they confront the problem of choice. Organizations are
happy to find any needle in a haystack rather than search
for the sharpest needle in the haystack. Human beings do
not consider all alternatives, but pick the action that is
"good enough," that satisfies. People in organizations are
quite reluctant to base actions on estimates of an
uncertain future.
- MODEL III: THE GOVERNMENTAL (BUREAUCRATIC) POLITICS
MODEL:
The third model focuses on politics of a government.
Events in foreign affairs are understood, according to this
model, neither as choices nor as outputs. Rather, what
happens is characterized as a "resultant" of various
bargaining games among players in the national government.
Model III analysts frames the puzzle: which results of what
kinds of bargaining among which players yield the critical
decisions and actions? He then fixes the unit of analysis:
political resultant. Next he focusses attention on certain
concepts: the perceptions, motivations, positions, power,
31
and maneuvers of the players. Finally he invokes certain
patterns of inference: if a government performd an action,
that action was the resultant of bargaining among players
in games.
The differences among these three frames of reference
will be explicitely explained in the following item.
H - THE THREE MODELS AND THE GAME OF CHESS:
Graham T. Allison provided an interesting central
metaphor that illuminates the differences among the three
models. He believes that foreign policy has often been
compared to the moves and sequences of moves in a game of
chess. He describes his metaphor as follows:
"Imagine a chess game in which the observer could
see only a screen upon which moves in the game
were projected with no information about how the
pieces came to be moved. Initially, most
observers would assume -- as model I does -- that
an individual chess player was moving the pieces
with reference to plans and tactics toward the
goals of winning the game (rational action). But
a pattern of moves can be imagined that would
lead some observers, after watching several
games, to consider a Model II assumption: the
chess player might not be a sigle individual but
rather a loose alliance of semi-independent
organizations, each of which moved its set of
pieces according to (SOP), standard operating
procedures. It is conceivable, furthermore, that
the patter of play might suggest to an observer a
Model III assumption: a number of distinct
players, with distinct objectives but shared
7
resultant of collegial bargaining. "
H - REASON FOR CHOOSING MODEL II:
After this long discussion about these three frames of
referance of bureaucracy, I chose model II, the
"Organizational Process Model", to apply it for the case
study of the "Egyptian International Hotel" project (EIH).
I have chosen that model because, of the three, it is
the one that can best help me to demonstrate, as an
architect having practiced in both the fields of projects
design and implementation, the output of the organizational
process and procedures on the projects development and
implementation processes in Egypt in general.
III - A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF BUREAUCRACY
IN EGYPT
34
A - INTRODUCTION:
AS a river civilization, Ancient Egypt had a highly
centeralized state and a well-developed professional
bureaucracy. Indeed, a1though it functioned under
subsistence rather than monetary economy, the civil service
of the New Kingdom 1,500 years before the Christian era was,
according to Max Weber-, "the historical model of all later
bureaucracies." The prestige- of this bureaucracy was as
hiqh as it has been in the recent past.
The most significant influence on contemporary Egypt
was the Arab-Islamic conquest in the seventh century A.D.,
which imposed a form of political absolutism based upon
religious dectorine that discouraged popular initiative in
political life. The country was ruled by Islamic regimes.
Several hundred years later, much of the administration was
in the hands of a special class recruited from abroad by
the Mameluke sultans. The Ottoman conquest of Egypt in the
early sixteenth century perpetuated foreign administration
of a servile character. Yet, many Egyptians, all through
these centuries, had managed to enter the government
service and to maintain their position by transmitting
35
their skills from generation to generation. Yet the tone of
administration was always the tone of Ottoman political
control whose principle instrument was fear than hope.
When Napoleon invaded Egypt (the French occupation
lasted f rom 1793 to 1801) , causing a Western penetration,
he raised the banner of nationalism in Egypt, as he had
done in Europe. This injection of European nationalism
influence had an immediate effect, for only four years
after the French were forced to evacuate. Egypt was ruled
by Mohamed Aly., the Turkish sultan, who pursued an
independent policy that set the stage for the emergence of
modern nationalism.
Then during the British occupation of Egypt, nearly a
century after the French invasion, Cromer in 1891 commented
that British control was exercised by exactly 39 officials,
8
who formed the "backbone of the Egyptian Administration".
In fact, little was done to develop the capacity for self-
government. The growing nationalist movement and the
accompanying grants of autonomy meant the steady
elimination of foreigners from the civil service and its
"Egyptianization". This process was accelerated by the
British declaration of Egypt's independance in 1922.
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Then in 1952, after many extraordinary changes, the
army carried out a revolution against the king and started
an era of "Democracy", which Seitz defined as follows:
"Democracy is a procedural device for establishing
substantive guidelines for structuring political
actions through the free, periodic election of
officials, competition for office, regular
turnover of official, and consti-tutionally
9
limited authority."
However, the environment of democracy exists in Egypt
rd
is extremely bureaucratic. Since the July 23 Revolution,
the political control was, all the time, by a limited group
of persons. It is true that there has been a public
assembly for several. years now, but nalf of its
representatives are farmers and labors who understand
nothing or very little about the political affairs.
Consequently, +he real control of the country is in the
hands of the political elite.
The increased centralization of authority created
problems related to the relationship among different levels
of government. So, issues of decentralization of power and
functions among different levels of government and the
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allocation of resources for each level have become
important areas of concern for our nation.
In fact, it is important to study the inter--agency
relations and the extent to which increased centralization
of political power can constraint the autonomy of these
agencies, particularly in the implementation of projects
involving several sectors and local governments. Besides,
it is important to realize the problems of power and
resources sharing involved in the relationships among
various levels of administrative and planning bodies of the
government.
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VI - THE CASE STUDY
THE EGYPTIAN INTERNATIONAL HOTEL PROJECT (EIH)
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A - INTRODUCTION
This case study demonstrates the effect of the
organizational process and procedures (Model II) which
influence the movement of a project along its trajectory
from idea to completion. I will demonstrate that through a
study of the case of the so-called "The Egyptian
International Hotel" project. This project was awarded by
the Ministry of Agriculture to the "Egyptian Designers and
Consultants Company" (EDCC), a public sector firm related
to the Ministry of Housing and Construction in Egypt, to
set its designs and to carry out the responsibility of its
imp 1 ementat ion.
Through this case study, I will manifest the effect of
the organizational processes behavior, within the EDCC and
with the various pertinant organizations or agencies
involved, to show how the interrelations are affected by
formal hierarchies and contacts between individuals working
in the field. Also, I will show how the bureaucractic
system, which exists in Egypt, affects project development
and implementation processes significantly. In addition, I
will demonstrate some other important factors that leave
heavy marks on projects development and implementation
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processes, such as the political leadership changes and the
uncertainty issue.
In other words, I will analyze the factors that
underlie projects implementation delay, including the
execution of some parts of a project's components a
situation that affects the decision of wheather or not to
construct such a project.
This is to help suggest paths to deal with these
factors of delay, as possible, when developing or
implementing other projects in the future.
NOTE:
Most of the events in this case study are real. The
dates I present for the project's events occurence are not
real. This is because I cannot remember the precise dates
of the events occurence and also the date when that project
first arrived at the EDCC. Yets it is a first hand
experience.
I would also like to mention that the names I use for
the different agencies are not real. My aim here is to
demonstrate. gga much as I can, the different factors that
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may affect project development and implementation processes
in Egypt in ggenral rather than to criticise precise
agencies.
My belief is that all these factors of projects delay
exist in any of the Egyptian governmental structure levels.
It exist on the central governmental level, the agencies
level as well as the implementors level.
So, my aim for this Study, as I previously mentioned,
will not be to review the project from the design
technical aspect but rather from the institutional and
political context.
Also, I would like to mention that the EDCC has started
recently to pursue some of the suggestions I am presenting.
Yet, because these suggestion are not pursued every where,
I am trying to cover, as many as I can, of the applicable
paths for change and correction.
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B - PROJECTS INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM (WITHIN THE EDCC):
To demonstrate our case study maybe it is appropriate
to present the general framework for the departments
involved in the project development and implementation
processes within the EDCC (see diagram 2).
However, most of the projects in Egypt arise
independently as contributions sposored by individual
governmental agencies. Most of these projects had mainly to
be carried out by public sector companies such as the EDCC.
In fact, the EDCC's clients are exclusively
governmental agencies who sign contracts with the EDCC to
carry out the responsibility for designing their projects,
individually or jointly with other subcontractors, then to
award contracts to the most suitable bidders, according to
terms of reference, on behalf of the clients. Then, the
EDCC's excutive staff has to supervise the projects'
excution process throughout the projects implementation
periods.
This movement, of any project, from idea to completion
can simply be presented as shown in diagram 3.The general
processes for .projects development and implementation in
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DCR : Sector of Design, Construction,
and Roads:
GB : General Building Projects Dept.
HB : Health Building Project Dept.
JBP : Judiciary Building Project Dept.
EB : Educational Building Project Dept.
OE : Out-of-Egypt project Department.
CP : City Planning Dept.
BC : Building Construction Dept.
ST : Soil Tests and Foundations Dept.
MC : Metalic Construction Dept.
RCC : Reinforced Concrete Projects Dept.
BR : Bridges and Roads Dept.
BSC
S
QS
EM
BS
NT
SES:
EES:
E :
Sector of Building Services:
Sanitary Works Department.
Quantitative and Specifications Dept.
Electricity and Mechanics Dept.
Building Sanitary Works Engineers.
Networks Design Engineers.
Sanitation Execution Supervisors Eng.
Electric Execution Supervisors Eng.
Elevators Designers.
ALA :Administration and
Legislation Sector:
L :Legislative Dept.
CO :Contracts and Bids Dept.
AD :Administration Dept.
IS :Implementation Supervision
Sector:
A :North Cairo District.
B :East Cairo District.
C :South Cairo District.
D :West Cairo District.
TECHNICIANS
THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF THE DEPARTENTS INVOLVED IN
THE PROJECT DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCESSES
WITHIN THE EDCC.
DIAGRAM (2)
PROJECT MECHANISM WITHIN THE EDCC
DIAGRAM (3)
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Egypt is as shown in chart 1 I adapted this chart
from the paper of Transportation Projects in Cairo, Egypt.
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PROJECT PROCESS
1
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PROJECT
IMPLEMENTATION
PROJECT DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION GENERAL PROCESS
IN EGYPT
CHART (1)
-S
C - THE EGYPT IAN INTERNATIONL HOTEL PROJECT DESCRIPTION:
- CLIENT
- IDEA
- OBJECTIVES
- LOCiTION
- DESIGNER
- PRELIMINARY
COSTS
: The Ministry of Agriculture (MA).
: The idea of constructing this project
occured as a result of the difficulties
that the foreign participants of the MA
encounter in -finding rooms at Cairo
hotels during the MA conferences periods.
: The MA aims were to provide its foreign
participants with comfortable places to
reside in during the conferences' time
periods; to provide areas that facilitate
holding conferences, for any business
purpose; and to gain foreign currency.
A site belongs to the MA at El--Dokki
neigborhood in El -GuiZ a governorate,
in Egypt.
The Eegyptian Designers and Consultants
Company (EDCC), a public sector firm
related to the Ministry of Housing and
Construction in Egypt.
Five million Egyptian pounds (including
design and construction costs) . Design
fees were counted according to the total
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costs of constructing the building as
fol lows:
3% for setting out the designs;
2.% for projects excution supervision
during its implementation time period.
- SUBCONTRACTORS: The EDCC signed contracts with:
- The Decoration and Architecture
Bureau (DAB), a private sector agency.
- The Egyptian Solar Energy Company (ESEC),
a private sector agency (to carry out the
building heating system).
- The Engineering Office of Dr. El--Areph,
(EO) a private sector agency (to carry out
the soil bearing tests).
- The Building Foundation Company (BFC), a
private sector agency (to set the designs
for building foundations and to execute
them after getting the EDCC's engineers
approval -for the design.
- PROJECT The project program submitted by the MA
components was conceptualized by the EDCC's
engineers to be consisting of two major
parts:
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1 - Part "A" the swimming pools
contain the following elements:
- The ground floor contains two
ls, one of
ldren, cabin
basement
Is faciliti
lets, etc.)
building
er reservoi
pumping the
building,
area to
swi mmin g
them to be designed for
s and a vast garden.
includes the swimming
es (lockers, showers,
machines for operating
(two huge underground
r, machines necessary
water up to supply the
some other pumps to serve
for fire protection purpose,
machines necessary for operating the
swimming pools).
2 - Part "B" the hotel to contain the
following elements:
- The basement includes the parking area,
laundry, air conditioning machines,
a boiler, and the floor facilities.
- The ground floor includes the reception
area, bank, travel agency, shops,
heardressers, and cafiteria that serves
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Poo
chi
- The
Poo
toi
the
w at
f or
and the
also the swimming pools area.
The first floor contains the dining
hall, kitchen, halls for private
meetings, conference hall, smoking area
and lounges.
- Duct floor [a level that is pri merly
given over to the concentration of the
mechanical systems for the building
(pipes for sewrage, water supply, and
air conditioning)J. This floor includes
also the facilities for the working
sta-f-f (dining hall, sleeping wards,
floor- facilities).
- From the second to the tenth floors,
each floor contains the hotel rooms
with private baths for each, common
lounges, and the floor services area.
- From the eleventh to the fourteenth
floor, each floor contains the hotel
suites, common lounges, and the floor
services area.
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D - PROJECT DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCESSES:
The contract between the MA and the EDCC states that
the work would start with the study phase for thirteen
months from the tenth of September 1980 to the tenth of
October 1981. The preliminary design had to be submitted to
the client to give his approval within the first three
months (before the end of the fiscal year to benifit
from the project allocation for that year). The final
working drawings had to be submitted to the client by the
tenth of October 1981. The project bidding process had to
be ended by the tenth of November 1981 when the
implementation period was to start.
The implementation phase would last for thirty months
starting with the hotel (part B) for twenty months then the
swimming pools area (part A) for ten months until the
tenth of February 1984.
* The fiscal year started in the month of January and ended
in the month of December (at that time).
5-2
NOTE:
To follow the project process during its development
and implementation phases, it will be helpful to refer to
both matrixs (1) and (2).
1 - THE DESIGN PHASE PROCESS
I was wor-king as an architect in the Department of
"General Projects" at the EDCC when the EIH project arrived
at the department. I started working in the project with
another co. lleague. Both the director and the general
director of the department were helpful and tended to
encourage the engineers to carry out their responsibilities
bravely offering them complete support.
Thus, we kept working with the project keeping a direct
contact with the client's staff, when necessary, until we
finished the project's preliminary design on time. So, by
December 1, 1980, we sent the designs to the client to
be reviewed and approved.
The client gave his approval after a full month despite
his being on a constant contact with the EDCC's designers
throughout the conceptualization period.
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We started to set the working drawings for the project,
taking into consideration the additional recommendations
requested by the client.
After work on the project had continued for about a
month, for some political considerations a change of the
government ministers occured. Then the minister of the
Minstry of Agriculture was changed. The new minister
carried out some changes in his ministry including, as
usual , transfering those who worked with the previous
minister whom we used to contact during the project's
preliminary design. Now, we were obliged to deal with a
completely new staff who were less familiar with the
project's requirements and process. Thus, a lot of other
modifications to the design were made.
Most importantly, the minister (and his staff) decided
to exclude five -floors of the hotel and some other
components to meet the budget allocated for the project for
that year (1981). That was due to the reduction in the
Ministry of Agriculture's appropriation for that year. The
minister justified his decision saying that there were some
other projects which he believed deserved "prioritization".
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These changes in the design obliged us to stop working
on the project's working drawings untill we modified the
preliminary design.
Here, it is very important to emphasize three main
points:
1- It is a fact that both political leadership change
and the governmental budget cycle may be sources
for potential opposition to a project.
2- The absence of an agreed upon methodological
"National Planning" framework combined with the
unclear definition of the national policy goals,
accordingly with the amount of resources available,
gives a complete chance to any new minister
to set his Ministry's projects priorities according
to his own judgement, which is might be affected
by a lot of different kinds of contacts and
relationships or maybe by some personal political
affairs.
3- The overlap between both the planning and the design
activities is a phenomenon that always occurs. Yet,
this sort of "loop-back" in the design process,
undoubtedly, caused much delay to the project
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study phase and caused the development time-table to
be extended.
Then after work had continued for another month and a
half, a new project arrived at the department. The
department's engineers were to set the preliminary design
for one of the El-EBasra University buildings in Iraq.
That project was urgent and the chairman of the EDCC gave
it special concern because he expected that that project
might bring the firm some other business with El-EBasra
University (which is what really happend). However, I was
asked to work in that project and to leave the EIH project
for a while. That situation delayed the EIH project design
phase for about one and a half month.
In fact, these situations poses some important points
to be considered for the projects delay factors:
1- Work in any project may be interrupted by another
project in any stage of its development and each of
the two projects is on a separate trajectory.
2- Projects always influence each other because each
one of them requires fulfiling related commitments
by the same source (which might not be able to
perform all the tasks required).
57
3- The number of the professional technical staff is
gradually getting limited. This is due to the
higher wage opportunities in private firms and in
the other Arab countries in particular. That deficit
in the professional manpower causes considerable
impact on the development and implementation
activities of the firm (and of any other agency in
general).
4- The firm's decision concerning projects priorities
is often made on the basis of high expectations for
a new project compared to older projects. Such
decisions will cause delay for older projects which
the firm tries to holds back to make room for the
new one.
The work in the EIH project started again for about two
months when a promotion inside the EDCC -firm occured. As a
result, a director from the "Implementation Supervision"
Sector was promoted and assigned as a general director for
the "Sanitary Works" Department (I will mention his effect
later). At the same time, the director of the "Sanitary
Works" Department was promoted and assigned as a general
director for the "General Projects" Department.
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Here, it is necessary to mention that promotion within
the bureaucratic system is usually linked to employees
length of service and the achievement of two continuous
excelent annual secret reports. Then the promotion
procedures will take place semi-automatically regardless of
wheather or not the person promoted will be in the position
which suits his or her experience.
The new general director tried for two months to make
full. use of his bureaucratic position by participating in
the project development. He insisted on making some major
changes in the design characteristics, regardless of the
consequences to the other related departments' designs.
My sincere effort to control and to limit these endless
changes by explaining their effect on the project's
development time and costs, were rewarded by transfering me
to the "Sanitary Works" Department (for the reason of "lack
of collaboration with my boss"). In fact, I expected the
same fate for my colleague, yet it seemed that he learned
the lesson well and so he made up his mind to obey the
boss' directions and to carry out the unlimited
modifications patiently avoiding any sort of opposition.
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However, a month after my transfer was the time for the
project's deadline. So the EDCC asked the client his
approval to extend the design phase period for an extra six
months (untill the tenth of April 1982). The firm's
argument was that the delay occured was due completely to
the client's frequent changes in the design components and
characteristics. The client agreed very easily especially
because he knew that he was really the one responsible
for the project's delay. Thus, the work on the EIH project
continued with no worry concerning the delay.
Here, I would like to emphasize the effect of using the
inter-departmental transfer as a tool for punishment and
its consequences on the decision-making personnel on the
top as well as on the rest of the employees.
In fact, the organization and the decision-making
personnnel within it are highly centeralized and top heavy.
The information flows are always from bottom to top. Those
who oppose their posses or carry bad news to them have
traditionally been disfavored. Therefore, subordinate
bureaucrats neither pass on displeasing information to
their superiors nor try to oppose them at all. This is
especially because the junior and middle level employees do
not have the decision-making authority in their own hands.
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So, the real decisions are made by people at the top
who have the least information and the least sincere advice
and who are the most removed actors from the project's
real problems. An adverse report from a superior may hurt
a bureaucrat but a good report will not yield any rewards.
Therefore, the tendency to "pass the buck" is very
evident in a general reluctance to make decisions at
juniors and middle levels.
Going back to the EIH project,, As I was working
seriously in the "Sanitary Works" Department, after five
months I was capable for handling the designs for large
size buildings when the EIH project arrived at the
"Building Survices" Department. At once, I asked the
general director to give it to me to set its design,
especially because I was completely familiar with its
architectural design.
Thus, I carried the responsibility of the project, yet
I could not start working on its design for about two
months. I was working on another project which was tied to
a design time-table. Besides, the point that there was a
deficit of the experienced technical manpower applies to
this situation.
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However, the time when I started working on the EIH
project was the time of the dead-line for the extension
period permitted by the client. So, the EDCC requested from
the client an additional three-month period, on condition
that it had to include the bidding process period.
The firm's argument this time was that there were a
lot of technical problems that appeared during the design
process which required a great deal of time to be solved.
Again, the client agreed and the work continued
under pressure -from the chairman himself and from all
the head-directors of the three technical sectors in the
firm .
At this point, I would like to give a brief comment
about what is going on:
1 - In general, the firm tends to underestimate a
project's design and implementation time-tables to
give the client good impression about the best
possible case for implementing his project (yet the
authorities recognize quite well that the time-
tables they propose are unreliable). This is why
there is no consideration for the unanticipated
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time delay factors which, by nature, will cause
these time-tables to be extended frequently in
order to fulfill the requirements of the project's
development and implementation phases.
2 - The client's approval to accept offering a second
extension period was due to the client's lowered
enthusiastism towards the project in general. This
is mainly due to several reasons:
a - The ministers in general, for some political
considerations, tend to think of new projects,
and they slate them very fast, rather than trying
to push the existing projects towards completion.
b - The long delay occures to any project, like the
case of the EIH project, might encourage the new
minister to use part of its appropriation for
another project he favours.
c - Unfortunately, there is less consideration, by
some authorities, concerning the time cost. A
fact that makes the situation worse.
However, the EDCC sent a copy of the building-loads
plan, done by the "Construction Department" engineers, to
the "Building Foundations Company" (BFC) to prepare the
foundations design. The EDCC informed the BFC to keep in
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touch with Dr. El-Areph's Office to obtain the soil-bearing
test results necessary for setting the foundation design.
On the other hand, the head of the "Building Services"
Sector of the EDCC tried to understand the reasons behind
the project's delay within his sector so as to facilitate
the project development completion. That man has a
revolutionary character. His aim was always to achieve
high quality designed projects regardless of any opposition
from the members of the bureaucratic system. He supervised
my work himself, especially because his main specialization
is in the sanitation works field.
When I suggested to him trying to use the solar energy
system, which had never been used in the department, for
the purpose of heating that large-sized building, instead
of the conventional system of using the boiler, he agreed
at once encouraging me to try to contact the appropriate
agency in that field.
Consequently, the firm signed a contract with the
"Egyptian Energy Company" (ESEC). That agency worked
enthusiastically with the project (on the hope of having
some other business with the EDCC in the future). They
provided the department with good information in the field.
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Of course that kind of work affected the designs for the
other related departments. Yet,, that was mainly due to the
lack of coordination among the EDCC's departments. However,
the periodic meetings for all the designers involved in the
project development process helped a great deal to resolve
the coordination problem as well as to resolve the
project s technical problems.
Anyhow, the work on project development continued for
about two more months, when the head of the "Building
Services" Department retired and a new person, from another
agency was assigned for that position (someone who enjoyed
good connections rather than good qualifications for the
job). That man caused additional pain to both the project
development process and to the staff working on that
project. He was a true bureaucrat. He started by refusing
the idea of using solar energy to heat the building, saying
that it was a new technique. He could not risk trying new
techniques during his era and he said that we must wait for
a year and a half when he also would retire, then we could
try whatever we 1iked.
That man, as a bureacrat, was uncomfortable if he did
not stick to the least controversial system or to the one
that showed results the most easily. That is why he
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insisted on returning to the conventional system by using a
boiler for the building, regardless of the money given to
the ESEC to design the solar energy system, and regardless
of the time and effort spent to amend the design to fit the
solar system. Also, regardless of the time constraint to
-finish the design phase by the tenth of July (a period of
less than one month), then to prepare the project for the
implementation phase. That sort of loop-back all the time
was one of the major factors of delay for the project's
development process.
Here, I would like to emphasize three important facts
reflected in this situation:
1 - This situation shows how bureaucrats are closed to
new ideas in technology, management., etc. It
reflects their general tendency to shrink away from
innovation to avoid being accused by their bosses
for any mistake. This attitude can influence
projects development process significantly.
2- The most dangerous fact in Egypt is the lack of
awarness of the precious value of time (even by
those who are on the decision-making level, which
make the situation worse).
3 - The bureaucratic system guarantees that every
person gets his salary by the end of the month.
This kills the spirit of competition which motivate
any person to care about his/her work and to exert
ones best to finish the work on time. Only the
motive of conscience is left. Besides, everyone is
aware that promotion is linked to ones length of
service. This awarness is enhanced by the Egyptian
general attitude of sympathy toward each other that
prevents any general director from giving bad
evaluations in the employees' annual secret report
Ewhich allows promotion for the employee who
achieves two continuous good years of an "A" level
(91% or up)]. As long as every one is sure about
getting this excellent evaluation, so why there
should be any "worry" that motivates working hard?.
Seitz provided a model which he called the "Lethargy
Model" and explained it to be:
"A personal system characterized by emphasis
on job classifications rather than the
individual holding that position. Besides,
advancement is not systematically encouraged,
and minimal job performance is sufficient to
10
guarantee tenure."
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However, not only did the system within the EDCC
(as a public sector agency) affect the EIH project
development processes but also the private agencies systems
did the same. For example:
- The "Decoration and Architecture Bureau" (DAB) staff
played their role in causing delay by bringing
modifications to the design after frequent long
periods. That caused the design details to be
amended many times. The DAB's staff did not work on
the project continuously (due to their prioritization
evaluation). Also, the lack of intrest to coordinate
the work between them and the EDCC team group ,from
both sides, plays its role.
- The Engineering Office of Dr. El--Areph (EO) staff
brought the results for the soil-bearing tests very
late (after the BFC's staff almost had prepared
the preliminary footing design following the
traditional system of the Footing and Semelles
system to save time) refer to sketch (1).
The soil-bearing results showed that the underground
water-table for that site is very high and consequently,
the suitable system to be followed would be the "Raft
Foundation" system (refer to sketch 2).
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The sanitation works (the inspection chambers,
sedimintation chambers, pipes' channels, etc.) had to be
formed into the raft foundation platform when pouring its
concrete.
Now, the BFC had to change its preliminary design and
that would require more time, which simply means more delay
and another expansion of both the development and the
implementation time-tables. This happened mainly because of
the factor of the lack of coordination between Dr. El-Areph'
staff and the BFC's staff.
In fact, the lack of coordination for the project
development activities among the different agencies and
organizations involved is, unfortunately, the common case
in Egypt that causes projects development and
implementation processes to be delayed. Yet, it may be
appropriate here to mention that the delay in getting the
results for the soil-bearing test by Dr. El-Areph's staff
was due to two other reasons:
1 - As that office is one of the most trustworthy ones
in this field, it carries out a huge amount of the
soil-bearing tests throyghout Egypt.
2 - Dr. El-Areph had to arrange his work in a way that
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could meet his contractor s circumstances and
problems.
Here, I believe that it is worthwhile to speak, in some
details, about Dr. El-Areph's contractor's problems, which
are generally the problems that any other contractor
or implementor in the field of construction encounters and
which cause delays to project development and
implementation phases. These problems are:
1 - Shortage in the construction labor manpower. That
is because most of the laborers now emigrate to the
Arab countries seeking higher wages for limited (or
even non-) experienced skills. This large scale of
emigration has affected not only employment and
wages in the construction sector itself, but in the
economy as a whole. Besides, the new enterants in
the construction sector are less skilled than those
they are replacing, and therefore affecting quality
and productivity.
2 The problem to assure getting the amount required
of the construction materials, for a project, and
to deliver it to the site, on time, according to
the implementation schedual. This problem is mainly
due to the market inability, in general, to provide
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sufficient quantities of the construction elements,
11
especially cement and steel [refer to charts (2)
and (3)).
3 - The government policy is to provide building
materials at subsidized prices, with preferential
treatement to the public sector (about 50 firms in
Egypt) and to the large private sector builders and
12
companies with building permit. In fact, the
government regulation of cement and rebars and the
system of allocation through building permits and
artificially keeping prices low has stimulated a
strong black market Crefer to chart (4)). However,
the inflation rate, for the general construction
13
costs, has reached 15% annually. So, in order to
control inflation in prices of cement and rebars
and to assure their availability for the public
sector projects in the development plan, the
Egyptian government, in 1961, began to control the
importation, distribution and pricing of cement and
rebars. The government currently imports more than
50% of the current construction reqirements of
14
cement and rebars. Concerning bricks, the price of
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CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS PROJECTIONS
CEMENT PROJECTIONS
Local production goal in 1980 3.6 million tons
Actual production in 1979 3.O million tons
Requirements for 1980 7.5 million tons
CHART 2
STEEL PROJECTION
Local production goal in 1980 300,000l tons
Requirements for 1980 900, 000 t tons
CHART 3
ALTERNATIVE MATERIAL PRICES 1976-1978
Material World Price Official Price Average Black Market
Cement LE 34/ton LE 18/ton LE 45/ton
Steel LE 180/ton LE 150/ton LE 190/ton
CHART 4
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bricks has risen rapidly from LE 7.5 per thousand
15
in 1970 to LE 20 per thousand in 1977. However, the
government is encouraging the substitution of red
bricks by the sand bricks at a subsidized price.
Yet, except for government production of sand brick
( 2"4 of brick production in 1976), pricing and
16
trading are open market. In fact, the production of
17
sand bricks is very low Crefer to chart (5)]. In
fact, even brick transfere became a problem.
4 - Problems in purchasing construction equipment
necessary to finish the job (such as tower cranes,
excavators, boring machines, wood necessary .for
construction, etc.). This problem is due either to
the lack of the availability of these equipment in
the local market (in other words, import companies
have not brought enough to the market), or to
importation problems. For example, the problem of
import may be due to the lack of foreign currency
available for purchases. Yet, if the foreign
currency is available the routine to import these
equipment will be a problem.
5 - The client may cause a dely if he does not pay the
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SAND BRICKS PROJECTION
Local production in 1980 200 m/year
Requirements in 1980 2, 400m/year
CHART 5
75
monthly invoices to the contractor on time.
Up to here, these different kinds and types of
relationships that affect the project development and
implementation processes were illustrated by professor
Gakenheimer as follows:
"Each of the participating individuals and
organizations exercises different types and
degrees of influence over project implementation,
and their roles are dynamically linked so that
there exists a continually changing pattern of
18
relationships".
Going back to the EIH project, by the beginning of
July 1982, the EDCC Department of "Contracts and Bids"
asked us, the engineers of the Building Services Department
involved in the project development, to prepare the bills
of quantities, items, specifications and costs "very fast"
because they had to start the bidding process among the
----------------------------------------------------------
* Invoice is a chart in which the contractor spells-out and
list the different kinds, quantities and costs for each
task's items which he had already finished, and which was
approved by the site supervisor engineer to be submitted
to the client for rembursement.
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bidders of both the public and private sectors to avoid the
penalty for the delay (the second extension period
permitted by the client would end one month after that
time). The firm's strategy was to benefit from the overlap
between the contractor's work on the site (the beginning of
the construction phase) and the working drawings completion
(the design phase).
The firm's strategy to benefit from the overlap between
both the construction and the design activities, urge me
to mention two important points:
1 - In many cases the overlap between the design and
the implementation activities can occur and save
time, especially because while working in the site
some technical problems may arise which require
changing the design details.
2 - Within the firm, it is well known that the more the
project costs, the more the profit will be and
consequently, the more incentives will be awarded
to the employees. This fact creates a powerful
incentive for some engineers to keep projects costs
estimate to a maximum. Their argument is always
that it is necessary to guarantee minimum errors in
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cost estimation to cover inflation afterwards
throughout the implementation period. Yet, in some
few cases, the inflation ratio fluctuated to a
degree that even the overestimated projects became
underestimated, especially when the periods of the
projects development and implementation phases
were extended for considerably long times.
Another thing I would like to mention is that when I
joined the Sanitary Services Department, I realized that
the way to prepare the bills of quantities for typing is
wasteful of the engineers time. It requires that the
engineers write the items' specifications every time they
prepare a new bill of quantities. So, I adopted an easy and
fast way to prepare these bills of quantities by keeping a
copy of each item, to be used whenever I prepare a new one,
and to leave the columns for the serial number, the item
number and the quantity calculated free. The only point is
that these papers for each item are of a half page length.
The department of Typists-pool did not like typing from
half pages. So, they opposed the idea and asked my general
director to prevent me from using it, despite it does not
cause them any additional time or effort. Unfortunately, my
department general director tried to please them by
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ordering me to use the conventional way. I refused to do
that until they got fed up with me. Now, all the engineers
in the sanitary Services Department are following my way.
However, after the bidding conference was over,
primarily, the staff of the department of "Contracts and
Bids" declared that there was a real competition among five
bidders' proposals because their estimates were very close
to each others. Yet, their estimates were much higher than
the estimates calculated by the EDCC's engineers.
In such a case, the Contracts Department could either
reannounce for another bidding conference or could go into
a "Negotiation Conference" among the three bidders who
proposed the least estimates. The second alternative was
agreed upon and the three bidders were informed of the date
of the second round conference. That conference ended with
an agreement to award two contracts to two bidders. Each
bidder would be responsible for one part of the project's
two parts (parts A and B).
Consequently, the Contracts and Bids Department as:ed
us, the responsible engineers, to recalculate the bills of
quantities and costs to separate the quantities and costs
of part "A" from those of part "B" and to define clearly
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the line on which the responsibilities of each contractor
were to meet.
This situation naturally caused additional delay time
but now the design was taking time -from the implementation
period (which consequently had to be extended, resulting in
project completion delay).
Here, I would like to mention that the overlap between
the design and the construction activities, was contrary to
the EDCC's expected strategy. The recalculations were done
in a hurry to save the situation, consequently, some items
were missed and not added to the bills of quantities.
On the other hand, by the time the different kinds of
service designs were completed, some items were deleted and
some others were added (as a result of some design changes,
errors,or even for some bureaucratic decisions).
This situation required hot negotiations with the
contractors to add the missed items to their contract's
tasks.
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2 - THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE PROCESS
Now the Building Foundations Company (EIFC) had prepared
the plans for the building foundations and was ready to
start working. The BFC asked the EDCC to send an executive
engineer to hand the site to them. Only then when the
EDCC's engineers realized that the dimensions of the site
in nature was less than its dimensions on drawings. This
late discovery affected the readjustment of the design
drawings for some time.
However, the BFC started working on planting the
"piles" and the "pile-caps" for part "B" of the building.
While planting a pile, the laborers were confronted with a
lot of water flushing out. When they investigated that,
they recognized that there was a very old water-supply pipe
line which for some reason was laid at an unusual depth
underground. That line was feeding two very old buildings
belonging to the MA. Consequently, work on the site was
delayed for long time untill the BFC fixed that line and
relocated it.
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The point here which I feel like to mention, is that
most of the water supply and sewrage net-works in Egypt are
very old (since the time when Egypt was a British Colony)
and the maps that define the locations for these utilities
either do not exist anymore or are incomplete. This
situation confronts many implementors during their
construction works. However, implementors in Egypt became
fully aware that the situation of unknown underground
utilities interference might occure, and that they had to
prepare themselves to deal with it (especially from the
cost readjustment point of view).
However, in some cases, it is not easy to relocate the
utility line which interferes with the construction work.
In such a case, an essential change in the design details
had to occur. Also, such a technical obstruction may
causes a continuous refinement of the planning through the
design and construction phases (a loop-back process).
Furthermore, when the BFC reached the stage of pouring
the raft foundation concrete, into which the sanitary works
had to be formed, the task of the contractor of part "B"
had to start. The contractors had problems in adjusting and
forming the places of the inspection chambers and the sewer
B2
pipe lines, etc. when pouring the raft foundation slab.
This was mainly because the drawings had so many critical
dimensions, which were hard to implement in nature of the
system of using raft foundation.
So, the designer was apt either to redesign that part
to suit the situation in nature or to cancel that part from
the design. In other words, the designer had to make some
modi fications to the design details.
In fact, I would like to emphasize the fact that the
overlapping uses of the land by different contractors
required additional time to negotiate their intrrelated
problems, especially when it appeared that the lack of
coordination between them started to mark its impact on the
project implementation period causing additional time
delay.
Moreover, the client sent a note to the "General
Sanitary Works" Organization requesting them to approve
providing the building with its necessary connections of
water supply, water for irrigation, and sewer disposal to
the main city nets. Only then, when we were confronted with
a real surprise. The total quantity of sewers disposed from
the building would exceed the capacity of the existing
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sewerage net. Consequently, the only solution was either to
cancel one of the two swimming pools or to eliminate
another five stories from the hotel. The EDCC adviced the
client to accept the first alternative.
However, there were no rush to make the decision by
that time because the execution of part "A" (the swimming
pools) was not supposed to start yet. Besides, work on the
fina]. designs was also not finished yet (the design phase
was still extending).
In fact, I had to mention that the engineer who went to
the "General Sanitary Works" Organization to bring the data
concerning the location, diameter, and depth of the
existing sewerage nets close to the site under study,
forgot about checking the point of capacity for the
existing city main sewerage net. He did not realize the
importance of considering such data. So, he did not tell
me the truth when I asked him about this point for two
reasons:
1 - He thought that it might not be an important or
critical one because it was unusual that we would
find that the capacity of the city sewerage net
could not accept the amount of sewerage disposed
from the building under study.
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2 - The engineer was not ready to go on another
official assignment because he had to use the
public transportations, as he was in a position
less than a director. Otherwise, he had to request
the department general director to allow him use a
car from the firm's fleet (according to the SOP).
However, this is another problem due to the less
cooperation from the firm's "Automobil Services
Dep ar t ment" especially with the limited number of
the firm's fleet cars.
However, the work went on very slowly because of the
technical problems that arose every now and then and also
because both of the two contractors were not concentrating
completely on pushing ahead the EIH project execution
process. Both of the two contractors were implementing some
other projects, at the same time, in other different
locations. This is why they distributed their equipment,
manpower, and funds among these projects so as to maintain
some level of stability in these projects implementation
processes. In case that an implementor. faces a problem with
any of his clients, because of his sloweness in carrying
out certain project, then the implementor strategy will be
to concentrat, only for some time, untill his pressing
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problem with that client be solved.
In fact, this attitude from the implementors remind me
with the Egyptian government general attitude concerning
projects completion. The government is concerned about
starting new projects and they tend to slat them very
fast, maybe during their conceptualization period. Yet,
once these projects are started the government begin to
relax and think of other new ^projects rather than
encouraging the movement of the current ones towards
completion. However, this attitude in some cases might be
a reflection of some political concerns).
This situation reflects a very important fact to be
considered. The government uncertainty concerning the
annual allocation of any project from one year to another
causes continuous adjustment to projects' priorities. This
gives an indication of the uncertainty concerning the
government commitment towards the projects' completion on
schedule. Consequently, that situation encourages the
implementors to give less priority to the first phase of
construction and to concentrate on the following phase.
A situation that usually causes the construction to be
unusable through all the implementation phases untill the
completion of the last phase.
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Here, professor Gakenheimer commented saying:
"In fact, uncertainty is a critical factor
of the environment in which organizations
live. They seek to avoid uncertainty by
trying to solve pressing problems rather
than developing long-run strategies. The
requirement that events in the distant
future be anticipated is avoided by
using decision rules that emphasize
19
short-run feedback."
Going back to the EIH project, the work continued,
monotonously, for about five months untill the middle of
the month of December when another political leadership
change occured. Unfortunately, the minister for the MA was
changed again. After two months the new minister asked for
a conference with the engineers who designed the EIH
project to discuss some important issues with them.
According to the bureaucratic system, the directors and
general directors, for all the departments involved in the
project, went to the minister's conference. With great pain
and severe shock I recieved the news that the minister
asked the EDCC's engineers their opinion concerning
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changing the concept of the EIH project and replace it with
another design for an "office building".
'The minister's opinion was based on his belief that the
EIH project had already lost its concept by excluding some
major parts of its components. Consequently, the "consensus
building activities" were changed. Besides, he added that
the proportion estimated for just one of the building's
various items which is purchssing the equipment necessary
for operating the building's different activities was
substantially high.
Another reason he added, was that the idea of that
building was a luxurious one, inspired by a minister who
did not realize that such a building would hardly recover
its costs in the long--run. The minister kept justifying his
opinion by saying that the new policy in Egypt, the open-
door policy, encourages the different agencies to seek
additional areas for office purposes. Consequently, the
minister believed that the market would absorb, very fast,
the extra office spaces, a situation that would assure a
cost recovery for the building in the short-run, if it were
constructed as an office building project.
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Here, I must emphasize what this point reveals. It is a
fact that the continuous changes in the project design
details and components may affect and change the consensus
building activities. In this case the governmental
organization may begin to hesitate concerning whether or
not to construct that building. This is another source of
oposition which a project may encounters and it is a very
strong one.
However, our f irm's bureaucrats did not get angry at
the minister's opinion, on the contrary, they mentioned to
him that his idea was worth study. They asked us, the
engineers of that poor project, to finish the working
drawings as fast as possible to submit them to the
minister, so the firm could ask for the rest of its fees
before he made up his mind concerning the project's idea
alteration. Thus, the final working drawings were submitted
by the middle of the month of February 1983 (yet with no
adequate consideration for its specifics).
Now I feel I should explain the general attitude of our
firm's bureaucrats. As they represent the firm's concern as
to achieving more profit, it does not matter for the firm's
authorities which project has to be implemented on a
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precise site, as long as they are going to have their fees.
The firms operate with perfect knowledge about the market
demand as well as the political interacting considerations.
It is a fact, unfortunately, that the firm's
authorities have no loyalty or commitment towards the
effort, the time, and the money spent for setting the
designs for any project. They care only about achieving
more profit for the firm as well as achieving the annual
targeted plan for the firm and even to exceed it.
Up to this point I have no idea about what happened to
that poor project because I came to the U.S.A.
Yet, I believe that the factors that affected the EIH
project's design and implementation process (up to this
situation) were mostly personal from both political
leaderships and the firm's bureaucrats. Let aside, the
general inadequencies of the Egyptian bureaucratic system.
In fact, the frequent changes of the government, and
the different goals and opinions of each new minister
concerning the budget cycle and the project priorities,
* The annual targeted plan is agreed upon with the Ministry
of Housing and Construction in Egypt.
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make a heavy impact on the project's completion. That is
mainly due to two points:
1 - The unclear difinition of the policy goals with
regard to the available national resources.
2 - The absence of an agreed methodological planning
framework.
91
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V - SUMMARY OF PROJECTS DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
SOURCES OF DELAY
The previous paradigm and the case study analysis
already covers the most important sources of external
impact on project development and implementation in Egypt.
These sources are illustrated in diagram 4.
The diagram presents the three major sequential stages
a project had to go through from idea to completion under
the effect of such external sources as follows:
FIRST : Project Idea:
There are several factors that influence the decision
of the client (a governmental agency) concerning carrying
out a project. These factors are both external and internal
ones, represented as follows:
a- The external factors refer to the sources of funds.
These sources are either governmental or foreign
financial support.
i - The governmental funds are affected by several
factors such as: political leadership changes,
national budget cycle, strategy for funds
allocation, project prioritization, availability
of foreign loan funds, etc.
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DEAGRAM (4)
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION STAGE
TS DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
ii- The foreign financial support is affected by
several factors such as: political relationship,
amount of aid, time of offering the aid, the aid
link to specific projects, etc.
b- The internal factors refer to the bureaucratic
effect, project prioritiZation, annual budget
allocation, political leadership changes, etc.
All these factors determine when
intensity the project will be undertaken.
awards the project to a design agency (li
and with what
Then the client
ke the EDCC).
SECOND: Project Development Stage:
The project development process is affected by both
external and internal factors that are represented as
follows:
a- The external factors refer to the subcontractors
impact on the project development process. Such
impact is affected by several factors such as:
competing projects, deficit in professional manpower,
scarce labor manpower, project prioritization, lack
of coordination, profit making, material procurement
problems, equipment importation problems, etc.
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b- The internal factors refer to the design agency's
policies and strategies. These strategies are
affected by several factors such as: project
prioritization, competing projects, bureaucracy,
scarce professional manpower, profit making, etc.
All these factors affect the project development
process significantly. Following this stage, the agency
announces the bidding and finally awards the contract (s) to
the most suitable bidder(s) according to terms of
reference.
THIRD : Project Implementation Stage:
The project implementation process is affected by the
contractor's policies and problems. These policies are
affected by several factors such as: competing projects,
annual reallocation, equipment importation problems,
availability of construction personnel, materials
procurement problems, unknown utilities locations,
unanticipated problems in construction, late invoice
payment, overlapping land use among agencies, lack of
coordination, etc.
All these factors affect project development and
implementation processes significantly.
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However, in order to move toward measures that will
improve the project developmemnt process, the issues are
best categorized by levels of the responsible agency, the
government, and the implementor.
FIRST :THE AGENCY LEVEL:
Possible sources of project delay at an agency level
were presented through the case study of the EIH project.
They can be summarized as follows:
A - Features of Organizational Practice that Repress
Initiative:
These features are due to both the bureaucratic system
of the agency and the promotion system within it. They have
many negative effects on project develo)pment and
implementation processes a.d result in project delay.
1 - The hierarchical system involves power by
leadership over employees. This power led to the
following in our study case:
a- Authorities too often use their power for
punishment rather than for reward. They use it
in different ways., such as: inter-departmental
transfer; giving bad evaluation to employees
in their secret annual report which prevents
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their promotion; the cutting
employee's
b- The fear of
supress bad i
a result,
based on
c- Authorities
project to
intrest and
causes ineffi
The promotional
certain negative
periodic bonus.
punishment encourages employees to
nformation from their bosses. As
supervi sors often make decisions
false or inadequate information.
may shift a professional from one
another with no concern for the
experience of that person. This
ciencies in project development.
system in our case study has
f eatures:
a- It is linked to the employee's length of sevice
rather than to his/her qualifications and
productivity.
b- A person can be promoted from one sector to
another within the same firm where a new job
must be learned. This causes project delays.
c- There is no effective reward for educational
initiative. For example, the salary of an
employee who received a doctorate degree may be
increased by only three Egyptian pounds per
month.
* This is equivalent to @ $2.5
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down of the
2 -
d- Periodic bonuses are usually based on a flat
rate. This serves as a disincentive for
employees who work hard.
B - Profit Motives of Firm:
The firm's profit motivation leads it to behave in
the following way:
1 - Overestimation of project costs to profit against
unexpected inflation.
2- Underestimation of both project development and
implementation time-tables to present to the client
the best case to implement his project.
3 - Setting priorities on projects in an environment of
acute deficit of technical manpower leads to
neglect and delay of projects of secondary
importance..
4 - Being unconcerned with project alterations, due to
changes in political leadership, as long as the
firm receives fees for all revised work.
C - Administrative Deficiency:
Administrative deficiency contribute to project delay
in the following way:
I - Unmanageable standard operating procedures such as:
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a- All employees, excluding the directors, when on
an official assignment, must use public
transportation and not a taxi unless specially
approved. This leads to waste of time. The
situation is further aggravated by the fact that
the number of cars that any agency can own i s
limited to a certain number by official
directions.
b- The rule that any official trip even if
it is to be out of the city of Cairo, should
start from the firm's building and not from the
employee's home, is inefficient. Most employees
avoid project trip assignments and instead
insist on mailing notes concerning, for example,
the data they need. This sometimes causes long
delay in receiving information.
c- The request for a car for an official
assignment must be approved by the department
general director. If he is absent or sick, it
might be a problem to get a car if the
"Automobile Service Department" personnel insist
on following the rules.
d- The Department of "Typist-pools" have the right
to refuse typing any bills of quantities, of
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construction materials used, prepared by any
department unless it is reviewed and signed by
the department general director. This is to
avoid retyping the entire bills of quantities in
case they require corrections (a situation that
frequently occurs).
2 - Lack of a system that assures consensus on
basic information about any project before
starting its design process. (Example: the late
discovery that the capacity of the city-sewerage
net cannot accept the amount of sewerage disposed
from the EIH building). A situation that caused
a loop-back process in design and at the end
caused the client to be hesitant about
constructing the building after the consensus
building activities were changed.
- The lack of an efficient tracking system in the
firm, which should have complete data concerning
project progress at any time.
4 - In case that bidding process allows awarding
contracts to more than one contractor, project
engineers had to define the details of the
contractors' respective responsibilities, the end
tasks to be carried out by each. This situation
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causes time delay and sometimes technical errors
and design errors.
5 - Lack of a system to coordinate the problems of
overlapping between contractors (in case of
awarding contracts to more than one). The need to
intervene between the contractors causes delay.
6- Project implementation phases are not adequately
administered, or studied, to make sure that the
components of the building completed first will be
operable through its subsequent implementation
phases. The uncertainty concerning the government
commitment to the project completion on schedule
encourages that to happen.
7 - The firm takes no action to assure the client's
reimbursement to the contractor(s) for his/their
monthly invoices on time.
D - Innovation Discouragement:
In a bureaucratic organization, people may shrink away
from innovation. They feel comfortable with the traditional
systems and avoid adopting new ones. This is to avoid being
accused of any mistake or being asked questions about the
new system they cannot answer. Bureaucrats seek promotion
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and good periodic bonuses which are based on no mistakes.
For example:
1 - The proposal to use solar heating for the EIH
buiI.ding was cancelled after long effort without
considering the economic losses implied by the
deci si on.
2 - The opposition from the Typing Pool and the
Sanitary Works general director to adapting a new
way of preparing the bills of quantities for
typing is another example. It rejected a good
saving in engineers' time while causing no
additional effort for the typists.
E - The Deficit in the Professional Technical Manpower:
Professional manpower is declining gradually, with
heavy impact on the activities of the firm. This is due to
the higher wage opportunities in private firms and in the
oil-rich Arab countries in general.
F - The Timing of Inputs from Parallel Activities:
The lack of coordination among the different agencies
involved in the project development and implementation
processes causes considerable project delay. Since each
agency has its own concerns toward its project priorities,
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the timing of their
causes modifications
loop-back::s which brinq
inputs differs considerably. This
to the project's design details and
about delay.
G - The Tendency to Segregate Between the Technical and the
Administrative Sectors:
There is lack of coordination between the working staff
of both the technical and the administrative sectors which
adversely affects the productivity of the firm.
Second:THE GOVERNMENT LEVEL:
There are a number of factors that are sources of
project delay at the governmental level revealed by the
case. They can be presented as follows:
1 - The absence of clear definition of policy goals
with regard to the amount of resources available.
2 - The absence of an agreed methodological planning
framework.
3 - The uncertainty concerning the availability of
funds required.
4 - The inefficient strategy for funds allocation.
5 - The lack of adequate initial studies of projects.
6 - Politi-cal leadership changes.
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7 - The shifting and overlapping roles of th
responsible organizations.
8 - Incapability to interpret national
policies.
9 - Importation rules and red tape problems.
e different
goals and
I: The Uncertainty Concerning the Availability of Funds
Required.
There are two major sources for funding any project
which affect its development and implementation processes:
A - Foreign Financial Support;
B - Governmental Funds.
These two sources of funds are affected by several
factors which can be presented as follows:
A - Foreign Financial Support:
Foreign financial support is affected b
factors which can be categorized as follows:
1 - Politics of the Middle East and
political relationships of the region.
2 - The availability of finance and aid.
3 - Aid linkage to specific projects.
political
international
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4 - Timing of offering the aid.
5 - Dependence on economy of donor countries.
6 - The impact of currency changes.
B - Governmental funds:
The governmental funds are affected by several
uncontrolable factors:
1 - The national political process.
2 - The availability of foreign loan funds.
- The national budget cycle.
4 The overlapping of organizational concerns which
cause competition among the different governmental
sectors for scarce capital resources.
5 - The existing institutions and the outcome of its
unresolved issues.
6 Level of -fund allocations which determine when and
with what intensity a project is undertaken. That
is the priority of a project to some extent governs
the total budget allocated.
7 - The large changes in appropriation of funds from
one year to another may exacerbate the
insufficiency of budget.
9 - Changes in domestic economies: changes in price and
demand.
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II: The
The
defined
factors:
Inefficient Strategy for
strategy for project
rules and is generally
Funds Allocation:
funds allocation lacks
affected by the following
1 - The underestimation of project costs. This is done
to encourage project approval. By the end, it may
cause delay or cancellation.
2 The underestimation of project's time-tables to
encourage its approval.
3- Affecting project priorities by personal interests
of the actors representing different participating
organizations.
III - Political Leadership Changes:
Changes in political leadership bring
ministers with different goals and opinions
projects annual allocation and priorities. Th
are free to do that because neither are ther
identified national goals, nor an agreed up
different
concerning
e ministers
e any clear
on planning
framework. These deficiencies encourage a new minister to
behave as follows:
1 - He tends to have a new staff who may not have any
idea about the projects in question.
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2 - He tends to change the project design just to feel
comfortable that he has given his opinion
concerning the projects under his authority and to
show that he has not ignored them. This situation
may cause a l.oop-back process. It may also
exacerbate project budget allocation.
IV: The Shifting and Overlapping Roles of the Different
Organizations Involved:
The overlapping roles of different organizations are a
usual phenomenon in Egypt. It causes project development
and implementation processes to be delayed significantly.
The owner of the project is usually known but who is
responsible for doing it always remains undefined.
V: Inadequate Administrative System:
The administrative system which exists in Egypt is
inadequate for implementation of policy decisions. The
governing institutions bear a clear imprint of the colonial
legacy: they are modelled after the British local authority
system. The British local authority model poses particular
problems about the division of authority and
responsibility. So, public administration in Egypt faces a
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whole range of institutional problems which plague
bureaucracies almost evreywhere. For any purpose involving
large-scale administration, modern states appear to have no
option but to ultimately adopt some form of bureaucratic
model for the institution concerned.
VI: Importation Rules:
Construction equipment importation is a real problem in
Egypt. The red tape plays a very heavy role in causing time
delays.
VII - Miscellaneous Factors:
There are some causes of project delay that can only be
listed as miscellaneous factors:
1 - The market's inability to provide the required
equipment and materials necessary for projects'
construction.
2 - The government expropriation of privately-owned
lands and dwellings (for projects for the public
good) is very hard to schedule in the overall
implementation process.
3- The weak control by the government over settlers
who squat on lands designated for governmental
projects.
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4 - Unexpected events like technological change and
the interference of any unknown underground
utilities (due to the incomplete existing maps
of utilities).
VIII: Lack of Project feasibility Studies:
Lack of project feasibility studies causes a substantial
economic loss especially with regard to the very limited
national resources. For example, I know two cases of
this kind in El-Dakahlia governorate in Egypt:
1 - The case of El-Dakahlia Milk Factory. The governor
of El-Dakahlia thought of building a huge factory
to produce all kinds of dairy products
(cheese, yogurt,, butter, skimmed milk, etc.).
The factory cost some millions of dollars to
construct. When the factory started to work
every one was confronted with a real surprise. The
governor ate' s mil k supply was not enough to run
the factory at full capacity. So, a lot of money
was spent inadequately resulting in an enormous
economic loss because of the lack: of an adequate
initial study.
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2 - The case of "El-Mansoura Cultural House": This
building was designed to constitute all the social
activities in the city of El-Mansoura. The building
appropriation was determined with a certain annual
allocation., The final designs were prepared after a
substantial time (due to a lot of political effects
and personal interactions). However, when work on
the foundations started a lot of technical problems
occurred due to the nature of that site's soil. The
soil was so weak that it required a lot of cement
and rebars for the building foundations which took
most of the money allocated for that building. This
happened because the initial study of the nature
of the soil was not adequately carried Out. The
result was that the construction process for that
building has lasted for more than fifteen years. A
fact that simply means a substantial economic loss.
THIRD: THE IMPLEMENTOR LEVEL:
There are a number of sources for project delay which
contractors and implementors encounter:
1 - Problems in purchasing construction equipment. This
is due to:
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a- The shortage of foreign currency; and
b- Importation regulation problems.
2 -Implementors have no assurence regarding t
availability of construction materials
time because of the market inability to provi
sufficient quantities of construction elements.
The delay in reimbursing the implementor for h
he
on
d e
is
monthly invoices on time.
4 - Shortage in the construction labor manpower;
problems of poorly skilled laborers who cannot
achieve a high-quality standard of work.
5 - Shortage in the technical manpower affects the
i mpl ementor. For example, a site may not be
supervised by a site engineer for a long time,
due to lack of technical staff in the supervising
f irm. When an engineer finally comes to the site
and finds the job was not done according
to the specifications, he stops the job and orders
it done again. This causes the implementor expense
and delay.
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VI - IMPLICATIONS FOR CHANGE
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Sources of project delay were revealed by the cases and
summarized in the last chapter. While in many cases the
problems are typical everywhere, the particular form of
them observed here, and the kinds of solutions that are
possible, are particular to the condition of Egypt. In many
ways an extraordinarily traditional and conservative
country, even when compared with others in the developing
wor I d, these problems in Egypt are uni que in many ways.
Moreover, the measures used to mitigate them have to be
chosen in such a way that they are not resisted by the
political leadership. Means of improvement must be
tolerable to the traditional framework of prerogative and
professionalism. We must, at the same time, face the fact
that many of these issues identified are basically
uncorrectable during the immediate future.
FIRST :Problems that can be corrected:
To present paths for change and correction, I will
follow the same categories used to summarize the sources
of project delay.
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I- The Ageny Level: Measures to counteract:
A- Features of Organizational Practice That Repress
Initiative:
1- Employees should be secured against being unfairly
punished. This can be achieved in the following way:
a-i-An employee should not be transferred to another
department against his/her wishes unless a meeting
with the chairman is held to discuss with the
employee and his department's general director the
reasons for that decision. Besides, the firm's
"Publ i c Rel ati ons" Department should i ssue a
a monthly magazine in which the employee's case
had to be presented. If the employee still feels
unsatisfied, he/she should have the right to
complain to the syndicate, which should
investigate the merit of the case. Although
syndicates in Egypt are weak, they might be called
upon to inform action on issues of this kind.
ii-In a case where several bad secret annual reports
are awarded, the firm should review these cases
through a special committee to which an employee
can complain.
iii-For the case of the bimonthly bonus, I propose
that the amount of reward should be dependent on
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factors that are to be calculated by the
"Accounting Department".
b - It is very important to decentralize decisions
by pushing them down to the levels where decision
is best informed. Junior professionals and mid-
career level employees should be given the
opportunity to participate in decisions when their
knowledge is important to those decisions.
c - To overcome the problem of deficit in the
technical manpower firms may allow their
engineers to take on projects as free-lance work,
based on the employees length of experience in the
field and not his/her length of sevrice.
d - Allow the employees to discuss their complaints
freely with superiors in order to seek resolution
of problems. A typical complaint is when the
coordinative functions of any employee's work with
other agencies is suppressed by a manager in the
interest of saving time.
2-a-Promotion should be encouraged on a competitive
bases rather than on the basis of length of service.
This can be achieved in the following way:
i-Linking income to personal productivity.
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ii-Formation of a special group of the most efficient
engineers who will receive high salaries (similar
to those offered by private companies and maybe
higher) to carry out the responsibility of setting
projects' preliminary designs. This is an effort
to deal with the very mixed quality of agency
personnel, giving adequate opportunities to those
who seek it.
iii-Encourage work with external consultants (despite
their high fees). Give those who are willing to
learn the chance to work with the consultants
and encourage them even to compete with them. Then
those who prove to be efficient should have the
chance to join the special group and earn higher
salaries. I believe that after some time the whole
firm will consist of completely competitive
special groups. This policy can be complementary
to the fact that Egypt is hosting many high
quality foreign professionals because of current
aid policies.
IV-As I mentioned before, allow the engineers to take
on additional projects on a free-lance basis for a
reasonable fee that does not exceed a certain
percentage of the employee's regular salary per
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month. This tribute is only for hard-working
employees whose names are written on a special
list, call it., for instance: "Hard Working
Employees List". This list has to be prepared by a
group, say of five persons, in the administrative
sector. Their focus will be the employee's
productivity over the last six months. In other
words, over three consecuetive bonus periods.
The list may be subjected to frequent changes,
according to employees' performance which will be
measured according to the relation between the
cost of the building and its preparation expenses.
This is another effort to give special
opportunities to high quality professionals.
These suggestions will oblige the employees to
understand the precious value of time and consequently will
assure more work accomplishment. Moreover, these
suggestions will provide employees with a secure status.
Their performance will be the only judge for their income
and position stability. Here, Seitz presented his
"Innovation Model" which he described as follows:
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"Innovative model is a person system characterized
by emphasis on the individual's job performance,
not the position occupied. In addition, advancement
and retention are determind by relative job
20
perf ormance."
b-Promotion should occur within the same specialized
sector and not from one sector to another. This is
to prevent assigning an employee to a position where
he is unfamiliar with the nature of the work.
c-In case an employee gets a higher educational
degree, such as a masters or a doctorate degree, his
monthly salary should be raised to a level that
reflects the degree he obtained. In other words,
there has to be a reward for obtaining higher
educational degrees.
d- The periodic bonuses should not be based on a flat
rate. Instead, they should be based on performance.
The formula could be based on a percentage of
project profit shared by the work team in set
portion depending on the kind and level of work of
each member.
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B - Profit Motives of Firm: Maximization:
In fact there is no specific way to oppose a firm's
strategy to maximize its profit. But it is essential
the firm to amend
1 - The initia
time-table
and imple
project 1
suggested
are no uni
its
i tE
s
men
egi
by
for
improvement
strategy as follows:
examination of both project costs and
must occur early in the development
tation processes in order to secure
timization and budget allocation, as
21
professor Gakenheimer. Since there
m standards for this purpose, initial
can be made by adopting standards for
casting and budgeting.
2 -It is appropriate to adjust the estimated time -
tables to include reasonable delays produced by
uncertainties.
3 -Concerning project alteration, I believe there is
no way the firm can deal with this.
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C - Administrative Deficiency:
Administration plays a very important role that affects
all the activities within any firm. So, much attention has
to be paid to correcting the administrative system of the
firm to assure a high rate of work accomplishment.
In fact, bureaucratic organizations are seen as being
adapted to problems of control rather than problems of
change. This is an important point to note, especially in
the case of countries, like Egypt, with a recent history
of colonial domination and rules. The problem in Egypt is
different and more severe than in many developing
countries.
In matters of this kind, a scientific management method
(such as PERT/CF'M) would be helpful in making the project
development process more robust, and making evident the
loss of time and money consequent to interventions and
management deficiencies. (See the appendix on PERT/CPM).
However, I believe that the following suggestions will
be of help to any agency:
1 - Encourage rules to be flexible to facilitate work
accomplishment rather than to hinder the firm's
productivity. Decentralize part of the general
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directors' responsibilities, which are better done
by the departmental directors.
2 -Establish a system for getting adequate initial
information about the possibilities to execute
certain sizes of buildings on certain locations to
avoid future changes in the design details. Also,
the firm should send one of its executive engineers
to survey
3 - Ask the
and to as
informal
case simr
Collective
neighborhc
was over,
site to st
existence
the site.
client to surround the site with a fence
sign a guard to protect it against the
settlements. I mention this to avoid a
ilar to the one of the "Services
Building" at El-Zawia EI-Hamra
od in Cairo. After the bidding process
when the contractor went to the
art working, he was confronted with the
of a three-story concrete skel eton
on the site. What happened was that the informal
sector realized that the government was planning to
build a project on that site. So, very quickly they
* For example: procedures for requesting cars for official
assignments, archive drawings withdrawal procedures,
bills of quantities approval for typing, etc. are not
critical matters.
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squatted on that site to oblige the government to
pay them a lot of money as a reimbursement.
Consequently, that situation delayed the execution
of the project for an unknown time.
4 - The firm's executive engineers should be required
to provide the data necessary for project sanitary
works. They are more efficient at that than others.
5 - Coordination within the firm should be encouraged.
This can be achieved as follows:
a- Encourage periodic meetings of members working
on a project. This seems a very basic
requirement, but is often not done in Egypt.
b- Establish a system of periodic follow-up through
which each general director has to be committed
to finish the work in a specific period (agreed
upon with the senior and junior engineers).
The chairperson of the follow-up meeting will
be responsible for reprimanding any person, on
any level, if a project under his/her
responsibility is delayed without an acceptable
reason.
6 - The "Follow-up Department" has to monitor projects
all the time, not only at the time of offering the
periodic bonuses. They have to submit monthly
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reports about project status to the head of each
sector so he can solve any problem on time. If
this does not work in a satisfactory way, it might
be supported by a "Management Aid System", to give
feed-back information about what is going on.
7 a- If a project consists of several components, it
might be appropriate, from the very beginning,
to calculate materials requirements separately.
This will help avoid delay if the building is to
be constructed by more than one contractor.
b- It might be appropriate to add a clause to the
contract between the firm and the implementor
stating that there might be some items to be
added or deleted during building construction as
long as both the design and the implementation
phases can be overlapped.
8 - The land-us.e-overlapping problem can be alleviated
if the project supervisor applies an appropriate
network analysis study (PERT/CPM).
9 - Engineers should adequately study the phasing
process to allow making the building usable
throughout the implementation of its sequential
phases. This may help the contractor to concentrate
on all the project's phases regardless of the
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uncertainty of the government committment to the
project's completion.
10 - The client should be obliged to pay the implementor
on time after completion of project components.
This could be achieved through giving the right to
the implementor to demand from the client a money
penalty agreed upon in the contract, say per half
month delay in reimbursement. It is one of the top
reasons in Egypt for a project to be delayed
because of the implementor cash flow problem..
D - Innovation Discouragement:
There must be a spirit of encouragement of the practice
of new ideas in technology, management, etc. to improve the
quality of the projects and to help improve productivity.
The employees should have the chance to present their ideas
to help achieve better quality work or to help improve the
work process or staff relationships. The firm should reward
innovative employees and describe their innovations in its
monthly internal magazine.
E - The Deficit in Professional Technical Manpower:
The problem of the deficit in professional technical
manpower, and its impact on the development and
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implementation activities of the firm, can be dealt with
as follows:
1 -Give the
additional
to the way
2 Encourage
Meetings"
Relations"
held under
who has
critical or
his collea
that, offer
of accompli
Establish a
within the
These trai
existing de
4 - Firms shou
organized b
Housing and
en g ineers the chance to carry out
projects on a free-lance basis (similar
of dealing with external consultants).
pursuing a system of "Accomplishment
that may be arranged by the "Public
Department. These meetings are to be
an approved request from any engineer
finished a design he feels includes
new idea(s) that he wants to share with
gues. To encourage an engineer to do
him a certain amount
shment meeting.
system of peri
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ning programs
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are ideas in
f or
different levels of authorities and for various
kinds of careers. These training programs help
introduce new concepts in design, planning, etc.
Some examples of these concepts are the site
and service, industrialized buildings, work study,
network analysis (PERT/CFM), etc.
F - The Timing Inputs from Parallel Activities:
Coordination among the different agencies involved in
project development and implementation processes should be
considered a fundamental issue. The external agencies, and
subcontractors, should be obliged to submit their studies
to the main design firm periodically. This can be achieved
through the contracts by assigning a late weekly submission
penalty. This will help assure having the subcontractors
studies inputs on time.
G - The Tendency to Segregate the Technical and the
Administrative Sectors:
Cooperation and good relations between the firm's
technical and administrative sectors should be highly
encouraged to assure more work accomplishment. This might
be achieved through frequent trips or- through special
training meetings in which the employees may understand the
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nature and the problems of work of the other sector.
II: THE GOVERNMENT LEVEL:
At the government level, studies concerning how to
formulate broad national goals, with regard to available
resources, are required. The studies must be based on the
following guidelines:
1 - There has to be an efficient strategy for funds
allocation. This strategy has to be linked to the
broad national goals. This is further explained in
diagram 5.
2 Projects have to be throughly studied, initially,
to assure their legitimization and annual
allocations. Besides, this will help avoid the
large investment.
In the case of the change in the political
leadership and the consequent staff changes, it is
appropriate that the design firm prepare a summary
of the project and submit it to the new
minister. This will help him to be familiar with
the project and its process and may reduce the
amount of changes in the design details and
character.
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4 - The government has to clearly identify the roles of
the different agencies and organizations involved
in any project's development and implementation
processes to avoid shifting and over-lapping roles.
In Egypt there is a tendency for such roles to
evolve and shift over time. For given projects
these roles should be stable.
5 - The government should facilitate the process of
import of materials and equipment necessary for
construction, to avoid delay because of current
regulations.
6- The government should pursue a policy that limits
both professional and labor emigration. This can be
achieved through creating incentives for staying in
Egypt.
7 - The government has to encourage the factories that
produce construction materials to improve their
productivity. The government may also construct new
factories, to eventually replace foreign aid
support.
8 - The government has to encourage technical
education to produce skilled technicians.
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Until now, I have been refering to the problems that
can be rectified at both the government and the agency
levels. As for the implementors' problems, if the above
mentioned suggestions are implemented, his/her problems
will be minimized.
SECOND: PROBLEMS THAT CANNOT BE CORRECTED:
These problems are not correctable in Egypt for the
forseeable future:
1 - The bureaucratic system cannot be completely
changed. Yet, it might be possible to deal. with its
negative effects and features partially.
2 The uncertainty issue is uncorrectable, but tends
to be mitigated by the actions mentioned above. It
includes the following items:
a- The availability of foreign loan funds;
b- The national budget cycle;
c- Budget allocation among the competing different
governmental sectors with their overlapping
concerns;
d- The low appropriation of funds for individual
projects;
e- The time of expropriation of privately-owned
lands and dwellings' problems;
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f- The government'"s weak control over the informal
sector; and
g- The interference of unanticipated time delay
factors, such as interfering underground
utilities or otherwise.
However, the uncertainty can be dealt wi th by a change
which ought to be monotonic, continuous, positive, gradual,
and have a constant context.
CONCLUSION
I hope that this covers all the possible factors that
affect project development and implementation processes
(including those that can be controlled and corrected and
those that cannot). I also hope that the lessons learned
and policies suggested will be considered by the
authorities in my very dear country, EGYPT.
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VII - Appendix (1)
PROJECT MANAGEMENT
A NETWORK MODEL
PERT/CPM
Projects that are undertaken and completed many times
over are those that best lend themselves to tight control.
The time, personnel, and other resources needed for
completion are fairly well understood from past experience.
Projects that are one-time-only undertakings are more
difficult to plan and control. Many activities in the
public sector are of this variety. The overall project may
be a first, but the components or tasks of the project have
been done many times before in similar projects. Some
examples are: construction of a highway or a hospital,
development and implementation of management system,
conducting a major research effort, etc.
The PERT model (performance evaluation review technique
or program evaluation review techni que) and the CPM
(critical path method) are two network models that are
developed concurrently for the planning and control of
projects. Each model has one main ingredient that is absent
in the other. The PERT system originally permitted three
different time estimates for each individual task, while
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CPM permitted only a single time estimate. On the other
hand, CFM identified time-cost trade-off point, whereas
PERT did not. During the years since their origin the two
methods have essentially been merged, with the current
product incorporating the advantages of each model as well
as many later developments. In the following discussion
there will be no distinction between PERT and CFM (we
actually use the termenology of PERT and the network
analysis of the CPM).
Content of PERT/CPM:
To plan and to control a project require two peices of
basic information about each task:
1 - The length of time to complete each task.
2 - The tasks that must be completed before another task
can begin.
Project Network:
In using the network diagram to illustrate the project,
activities are represented by circles and sequencing is
represented by arrows. Once the network is complete, the
estimated time of each activity can be inserted in the
circle representing that activity. The activities
represented by the "start" circle and "finish" circle are
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not real activities but merely signify the beginning and
end of the project. The estimated time for each activity
can be used to estimate the time -for the whole project; in
particular the time estimates will lead to the critical
path for the project (refer to figure 1).
The Critical Path:
A series of connected activities is called a path. The
length of time associated with the path is the sum of thp
time estimates associated with each of the activities on
the path. The path with the greatest time estimate is
called the "critical path". The time required to complete
the critical path is the shortest amount of time in which
the entire project can be completed. Delays allong the
critical path result in a delay of the project; if the
project is to be completed in less than the time estimate
of the critical path, then one or more activities on the
critical path must be hurried or "crashed" so that their
combined completion time becomes less than the original
estimate. On the other hand, crashing an activity not on
the critical path will provide no benefit. A delay in a
noncritical activity will have no effect on the project
finish time. For a more complex projects a more formal
method of determining the critical path is needed.
135
Fabricate steelwork
Frect
steetwork
Figure 1. Network diagram for a simple project, showing component operations.
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Project
Start
Project
Finish
Early Time, Late Time, and Slack:
In order to find the critical path of a network, we
first determin the "early start time" (ES) and the "late
start time" (LS) for each activity. ES is the earliest that
an activity can start after all preceeding tasks are
completed. LS is the latest that an activity can start
without delaying the entire project. The difference LS-ES
is called "slack"; it represents the amount by which an
activity can be delayed without delaying the project. An
activity that has no slack is called a critical activity;
the path of critical activities is the critical path.
So, passing through the network from start to finish we
find the following:
1 - The early start time of an activity with no
predecssors is zero.
2 - The early finish time (EF) of each activity is the
sum of its early start time plus the time required
to complete it.
3 - The early start time (ES) of any other activity is
the latest of its immediate predecessors' early
finish time. ES of any other activity is equale to
the largest of the EF of all of its immediate
predecessors.
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The next step to find the critical path is to determin
the late start (LS) and the late finish (LF) for each
activity. The late start time for any activity is the
latest that that activity can commence without delaying the
whole project. The late finish time of any activity is the
latest that that activity can finish without delaying the
whole project. In order to determin LS and LF of each
activity, pass through the network backwards, from finish
to start as follows:
1 - The late f inish time of an activity with no
successors equals project's finish time.
2 The late start time of any activity is its late
finish time minus the time to complete it.
3 - The late finish time of any other activity is the
smallest of its successor's late start times (refer
to figure 2).
The "slack" is the amount of time an activity can be
delayed without delaying the entire project. The slack for
an activity is found by getting the difference between its
LS and its ES. (equivalently, this is also the difference
between its LF and EF). Shared slack is shared with the
other activities in sequence with it. "Free slack" is the
amount of time an activity can be delayed without delaying
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0 2 6 7
1 38 9
Figure 2. PERT diagram with
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or reducing the slack of any other activity.
Activities with zero slack are termed "critical
activities". A delay in any critical activity will delay
the entire project. A sequence of critical activities forms
a critical path. It may happen that there is more than one
critical path.
As one can imagin, complex projects generate rather
complex networks. There are many computer programs
available for computing the slack: and finding the critical
path, provided one knows the sequence and estimated times
of activities. Having -found the project completion time,
one can then determin when the project must start in order
for it to be completed on time.
Crashing Activity Times:
The costs of project are of three basic kinds:
1 - Direct costs of activities.
2 - Indirect costs of supervision, administration, and
so forth.
3 - Opportunity costs including late penalties and
forfeited early bonuses.
Generally, as the overall length of a project
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increases, the direct costs decreases, but the indirect
and opportunity costs increase. Consequently, crashing
activities may decrease total project costs while
increasing direct costs. Costs here include monetary
outlays and nonmonetary effects. Estimated activity times
are ordinarily based on normal working conditions. The
length of times required to complete an activity can
sometimes be shortened, at a price. In some instances that
price may be a dollar cost; for instance, additional
personnel may have to be hired temporarily or regular
personnel may be asked to work overtime. In other instances
crashing the activity may lessen the quality of the
activities; for instance, the surface of the highway may
not be quite smooth if the smoothing operation has been
rushed, or an agency report may be less informative if
charts have to be omitted in the rush, or the proper
equipment may not be available if the sites have to be
hurriedly selected.
If it is necessary to speed up the project, then-it is
worthwhile deter-mining (1) which activities are worth
crashing and (2) which of those activities can be crashed
at least cost, either monetary or otherwise. When the crash
time of the critical path is less than the regular time of
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a noncritical path, then noncritical activities may also
have to be crashed.
Variable Activity Times:
The time required by most activities, especially those
depending on human performance, is rarely a constant.
Rather than make a sinqle estimate of the activity time,
three estimates are made. The three different estimates and
their symbols are:
a The optimistic time. This is the shortest amount of
time the activity would need under the most favorable
circumestances short of a miracle. The probability is
very small that the activity aould actually be
completed in this amount of time.
m The most likely time. This is the amount of time that
the activity is most likely to require.
b The pessimistic time. This is the amount of time the
activity needs under the most unfavorable
circumestances short of an act of God or some man-made
catastrophe. The probability is small that this amount
of time would actually be needed by the activity.
From these three estimates of activity time the mean.,
or expected activity time, is found by getting a weighted
average of the three estimates. Intuitively it seems
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reasonable that the most likely time "m" shoul d be given a
greater weight than either the optimistic time "a" or the
pessimistic time "b". the equation for the expected
activity time supports this notion; it is:
a + 4m + b
t = - - - - - -
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Allison Graham T., Te Essence of Decision, Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crises, 1971.
----------------- , The Essence of Decision.
Berger Morroe, BUreagcracy and Society in Modern Egypt
A study of The Higher Civil Service, New
York/Russell, 1957.
9. Seitz , BUreaucracy Pglicy and the Public.L
10. Seitz , _greagracy. Pglicy and the Pub lic,
11. United States Agency for International Development, Cgountry
Develomegnt Strategy Statement FY 1984 Annex.
EgyptL Urban Policy and Strategy (February 1982),
(hearafter called "CDSS"), 11, G.
12. CDSS, 11.
13. ABT Associates Inc., informal Housing in Egygt, Cambridge,
November 1981,60.
14. Mourad Moustaf a,
the
"The Need for a New Approach: Analysis of
Built Environment of the Informal
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Settelemnts and Publick Housing Policy in
Egypt", Thesis for Master Degree in
Architecture, M.I.T., June 1983.
15. Joint Housing and Community Upgrading Team, Housing and
Community Ungading fgC low-Income Egygtians,
August 1977, (hearafter called HUC), 21.
16. CDSS, A-6.
17. HCU, 10.
18. Gakenheimer Ralph, El-Hawary Mohamed., Michael Martin,
"Transportation Projects in Cairo, Egypt",
Studied with a view Toward Rationalizing the
Project Planning Process, with the Assistance of
the Egyptian Ministry of Transport (Transport
Planning Authority), October 1978.
19.------------------, "Transportation Projects in Cairo, Egypt".
20. --------, Bureaucracy. Fglicy and the Public,
21. Gakenheimer Ralph,"Transportation Projects in Cairo, Egypt".
145
IX - REFERENCES
1 - Abrahamsson Benget, Bureaucray g garticigation, the
logic of organization, volume 51, Sage
Publications, Beverly Hills, London, 1977.
2 - Allison Graham T., The Essence of Decision,
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crises, 1971.
3 - Antill J. M., and Woodhead Ronald W., CEitical Path
Methods in Constructign Pracgtic, University of
New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, 1982.
4 - Bardach, E., The implementation Game, gambridge, MA:
M.I.T. Press 1977.
5 - Berger Morroe, _Breaucracy and Society in Modern
Egypt, A study of The Higher Civil Service, New
York/Russell, 1957.
6 - Cook and Kuhn (ec Is.) Planning Frocess in Develoing
Countries: TechniguE and Achievements..
Amstrdam, New York, Oxford: North-Holland
Publishing Company, 1982.
7 - Crozier M., The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1964, p.194.
8 - Dyer Fredrick C. and Dyer John M. , Byreaucracy Vs.
Creativity, University of Miami Press, Coral
Gables, Florida 1969.
9 - Gakenheimer Ralph. El-Hawary Mohamed,
Martin, "Transportation Projects in
Michael
Cairo,
146
Egypt", Studied with a view Toward Rationalizing
the Project Planning Proces, with the assistance
of the "Egyptian Ministry of Transport"
(Transport Planning Authority), October 1978.
10 - Grindle S. Merilee, Politics and
LgpI ementation in the Third World,
University Press, New Jersy, 1980.
11 - Grindle M., Pglicy gontent and C
Iglementation, New York: Oxford
Press, 1976.
12,- Hummel Ralph P., Ihe Bureaucratic Egeri en
edition, St. Martin's Press, New York,
13 - Hyden G.
(editor
Kenyan
Press,
Pglicy
Princton
ontext in
University
ceL second
1982.
R.H. Jackson and J.J. Okumu
s), Develoment Administration: The
ExgeCience (Nairobi: Oxford University
1870).
14 - Joint Housing and Community Upgrading Team,
Housng nd Commnity U2ggqding fgC Low-Income
Eqygtians (August 1977).
15 - Mourad Moustafa, "The Need for a New Approach:
Analysis of the Built Environment of the
Informal Settlements and Public Housing Policy
in Egypt", Thesis for Master Degree in
Architecture, M.I.T., June 1983.
147
16 - Nakamura, R. and F. Smallwood, The Politics of
Policy Imglementation, New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1980.
17 - Obomanu, John Y., "Constraints in Plan Implementation:
The case of Kenya's Housing Policy", Thesis for
Master Degree of City Planning, M.I.T., May
1983.
18 - Pressman J.L. and A. Wildavsky, Implementation
Berkely: University of California Press, 1973.
19 - Seitz, Bureaucracy Pglicy and the Public.L
20 - Stern R. E., Hogusing The Urban Poor in Africa:. Policy
Poli tics,. and Bureaucracy in Mombasa, Institute
of International Studies, Berkely: University of
California Press, 1978.
21 - Technology Adaptation Program (TAP) report 79-5,
Housing Policies and Urban "Markets" in
Developing Countries: The Egyptian Experience",
13.
22 - The World Bank, Urbanization Sector Working
Eag2e (Washimgton, D.C.: The World Bank, 1972),
23 - United States Agency for International Development,
Country DStraggrent Straegy Sgtatement FY 1984
Annex Egygt. Urban Policy and Strategy (February
1982).
24 - Van Meter, D. and C. Van Horn, "The Policy
Implementation Process: A conceptual framework",
Administration and Society, vol. 6, no. 4,
February 1975.
148
25 - Weber Max, The Theory of the Bureaucracy in Grusky,
0. and G.A. Miller (editors), The Sociology of
Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1970).
149
